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Abstract 
This paper investigates the causes of split sovereign ratings across S&P, Moody’s and Fitch 
for 64 countries from 1997 to 2011. We identify that split sovereign ratings are not 
symmetric, with S&P tending to be the most conservative agency. We find that opaque 
sovereigns are more likely to receive split ratings. Political risk plays a highly significant role 
in explaining split ratings and dominates economic and financial indicators. Out-of-sample 
model performance is enhanced by capturing political risk. Government information 
disclosure affects split ratings between Moody’s and Fitch in emerging countries. The study 
implies an incentive for governments to reduce political uncertainty and to enhance 
transparency. 
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1. Introduction 
Amid persistent concerns surrounding the international economic outlook in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis, credit rating agencies (CRAs) have attracted a higher 
profile. In Europe, there was a strong wave of negative sovereign rating actions which 
resulted in split ratings for many high-rated countries in this region. Split ratings arise when 
different CRAs assign unequal ratings to the same issuer at the same time (e.g. Livingston 
and Zhou, 2010). They may be temporary due to the CRAs’ asynchronous actions or may 
become persistent if the disparity in ratings continues over time.  
During recent years, split sovereign ratings no longer prevail solely within low-rated 
sovereigns in emerging countries as documented by Cantor and Packer (1996a), but are 
evident across different levels of economic development. Yet, there is very little evidence on 
the causes of split sovereign ratings. Cantor and Packer (1996a) attribute split ratings to the 
CRAs’ lack of experience in rating sovereign default risk, but they provide little empirical 
evidence on this. Hill et al. (2010) report differences in the credit rating models across the 
largest CRAs, but they do not relate this to split sovereign ratings. Alsakka and ap Gwilym 
(2012) analyse macroeconomic factors, low creditworthiness and home bias as potential 
causes of split sovereign ratings, yet their research is focused only on emerging countries.  
We hypothesize that split sovereign ratings arise due to information opacity rather 
than random errors by the CRAs.
1
 The information opacity hypothesis for split ratings has 
been tested for corporate issuers and across industries. Morgan (2002) finds that split ratings 
occur more often in banks and insurance companies because their assets are more opaque. 
Livingston et al. (2007) and Hyytinen and Pajarinen (2008) evaluate corporate opacity by 
considering firm age, intangible assets, and other observables. We contribute to previous 
                                                          
1
 Ederington (1986) concludes that corporate bond split ratings result from random rating errors, which suggests 
that split ratings are symmetric between any pair of CRAs. See Section 3 for more details on the random error 
versus the information opacity hypotheses of split ratings. 
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literature by providing new evidence on the information opacity hypothesis for sovereign 
issuers. We contend that opacity arises when CRAs rely, to a great extent, on subjective 
evaluations of sovereign risk. We focus on two key sources of opacity in assessing sovereign 
ratings: the quality of information disclosure by governments and political risk. 
We firstly consider split sovereign ratings in the light of governments’ information 
quality and transparency. This approach is original because we focus on the openness and 
willingness of the government to release information in the public domain. Information from 
transparent sovereigns is richer, more accessible and updated more frequently than from 
opaque sovereigns. Split sovereign ratings could arise when CRAs have limited access to 
high-quality data with which to base their credit assessments. Quality of information is 
central to the quality of credit ratings. Recent developments in the regulatory sphere suggest 
that CRAs should be held accountable for taking appropriate measures to make use of all the 
available information from credible sources (European Commission, 2009). Policy makers 
also call on the CRAs and governments to be more transparent in terms of information 
disclosure (House of Lords, 2011). Therefore, material changes in the quality of the data 
utilised by the rating analysts must be signalled to the users. While regulators are interested in 
the transparency of the CRAs, we emphasize the potential benefits from governments’ 
transparency.  
Among the determinants of sovereign ratings, we focus on the importance of political 
risk (see Butler and Fauver, 2006; Mellios and Paget-Blanc, 2006; Afonso et al., 2011). In 
contrast with corporates, sovereign credit ratings consider the governments’ capacity and 
willingness to repay. The latter factor is affected by political concerns. Political risk 
represents the soundness and stability of the legal and institutional systems of a country. 
From the perspective of financial market participants, it commands a significant risk 
premium and raises stocks’ correlations and volatilities, particularly in weak economic 
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conditions (Pástor and Veronesi, 2013). Recently, political risk has attracted considerable 
attention, not only in emerging markets, which are commonly characterised by a lack of 
political stability, but also in European countries. Europe is facing a confluence of serious 
political challenges. The impact of challenging political dynamics has been particularly 
evident in Greece, as well as the rise of new anti-reform political parties in some countries 
(e.g. Portugal and Spain) and disagreements within governments (e.g. France) reduce the 
governments’ willingness to embark on structural reforms and fiscal consolidation. 2 
However, the assessment of political issues usually involves subjectivity and ambiguity. 
Therefore, we expect that political risk triggers greater differences of opinions and 
interpretation by CRAs than do the quantitative indicators (typically used for economic and 
financial risks). By addressing political risk, this study is clearly differentiated from literature 
on split corporate ratings and from the very limited prior work on split sovereign ratings.  
We investigate the determinants of split sovereign ratings from the three largest 
CRAs (S&P, Fitch and Moody's) using ratings, outlook and watch information from 1997 to 
2011. Our data allow for consideration of split sovereign ratings in many developed 
countries, including a focus on the European dimension. Further, prior studies on split ratings 
only consider the rating notations, while outlook and watch are ignored.
3
 In fact, outlook and 
watch signals can be at least as important as rating changes in their impact on financial 
markets (e.g. Sy, 2004; Kim and Wu, 2011; Afonso et al., 2012). A CRA’s complete opinion 
on an issuer consists of a credit rating and a rating outlook/watch status, so split ratings in our 
paper are expressed based on all these elements.  
                                                          
2
 A recent example of such political influence on ratings is S&P’s downgrade of Poland in January 2016, which 
was stated to be driven by concerns regarding radical policies implemented by its new conservative government, 
e.g. steps taken by the new government to seize control of Poland’s public media and to challenge the 
independence of its constitutional court. 
3
 Outlook changes indicate the changes between four statuses: positive, negative, stable and developing (or 
evolving by Fitch). Watch changes indicate the changes between watch for possible upgrade, watch for possible 
downgrade, watch with uncertain direction and no watch assignment.  
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Our empirical analysis supports the opacity hypothesis in explaining split sovereign 
ratings. We show that split sovereign ratings are lopsided rather than symmetric, with S&P 
tending to be the most conservative. We identify the importance of opacity inherent in 
political risk, particularly in countries outside Europe. We use six Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) published by the World Bank as the political risk proxy variables, and find 
that they are significant explanatory factors. Out-of-sample model performance is enhanced 
by capturing political risk. We highlight that rating splits that involve Fitch (vs. Moody’s or 
S&P) are more prone to the political factor. This may imply a more political risk-focused 
approach to assess sovereign risk by Fitch relative to the other two CRAs. Further, we assess 
the information disclosure quality by whether (and for how long) a Freedom of Information 
Act has been in place. Our findings reveal that an incentive exists for non-European emerging 
countries to provide the CRAs with updated, credible information, but the evidence is only 
linked to Moody’s vs. Fitch ratings. 
We make several important contributions to the literature. First, we provide evidence 
that opacity is highly relevant to split ratings of sovereign issuers. Second, we distinguish our 
study from the literature on split corporate ratings by introducing a political risk factor to 
represent the “willingness to pay” element of sovereign ratings. Third, we introduce an 
approach to analysing the link between split ratings and quality of information disclosure by 
governments. Fourth, we identify that these effects differ between European countries and 
emerging markets in the rest of the world. Finally, the prior credit rating literature has defined 
split ratings using only the rating notations; this paper is the first to define split ratings that 
also incorporate the differences in outlook and watch statuses between two CRAs. 
          The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 reviews related literature, 
section 3 states our proposed hypotheses on split sovereign ratings, section 4 describes the 
data and the methodology, section 5 discusses the empirical results, and section 6 concludes. 
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2. Literature Review 
Prompted by the increased demand for external borrowing by central governments, 
the sovereign rating market has grown sharply over the past two decades. Recently, there 
have been complaints from governments about the CRAs exacerbating market panic during 
crisis times with excessive downgrades on sovereign ratings and changes in CRA regulation 
are in progress around the world. There have been numerous papers dealing with sovereign 
ratings from different angles, which can be grouped into three main strands of literature.  
The first strand aims to identify the determinants of sovereign credit rating levels. 
Several studies suggest that ratings can be predicted with relatively few quantitative 
economic indicators such as GDP per capita, GDP growth, inflation, external debt, the level 
of economic development and default history (e.g. Cantor and Packer, 1996b). Some studies 
report the political and/or institutional environment to be significant for sovereign ratings 
(e.g. Butler and Fauver, 2006). Some economic and financial determinants affect ratings in 
the short run, while others impact ratings in the long run (Afonso et al., 2011). However, 
these determinants do not carry the same degree of importance through time, across the 
CRAs, and between developed and developing countries (Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, 2005; Hill 
et al., 2010). The second strand of the literature focuses on modelling the probability of 
sovereign credit rating migration. Fuertes and Kalotychou (2007) and Hill et al. (2010) 
document evidence that forecasts of potential rating changes can be improved with 
information from rating outlook, watch, rating momentum and duration.  
The third strand of literature relates sovereign credit signals such as sovereign rating 
changes, outlook and watch changes directly to the financial markets. Rating signals are 
treated as events which trigger responses from market participants. Sovereign credit signals 
have an effect on various asset classes including credit derivatives, bonds, equity and foreign 
exchange. Many studies detect significant market reactions to negative signals, while the 
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reactions to positive signals are either muted or negligible (e.g. Sy, 2004; Afonso et al., 
2012). The information value of CRAs’ credit opinions is significant even after controlling 
for sovereign credit spreads and country fundamentals (Cavallo et al., 2013). In addition, the 
effect of sovereign rating events is transferred from country to country due to strengthening 
global market linkages (Gande and Parsley, 2005; Ferreira and Gama, 2007), as well as from 
sovereign issuers to sub-sovereign issuers due to the sovereign ceiling effect (e.g. Williams et 
al., 2013). Sovereign credit signals also affect the international bank flows to emerging 
countries and the stock and bond market correlations with their respective regional markets 
(Kim and Wu, 2011; Christopher et al., 2012). 
Although the above research on sovereign credit ratings has developed over some 
time, there is very little evidence on split sovereign ratings. Split ratings arise from multiple 
credit ratings, a situation in which one bond issuer is assigned ratings by at least two CRAs. 
Prior studies on multiple ratings are mainly conducted in the context of corporate ratings. 
From the perspective of bond issuers, Mählmann (2009) and Bongaerts et al. (2012) 
investigate the issuers’ incentives for purchasing multiple credit ratings. From the bond-
holders’ perspective, researchers investigate how bond valuation is adjusted to split ratings 
(e.g. Jewell and Livingston, 1998; Livingston and Zhou, 2010; Livingston et al., 2010) and 
the relationship between split ratings and rating migration (e.g. Livingston et al., 2008).  
Researchers have attempted to explain split corporate ratings. Pottier and Sommer 
(1999) reject that splits are random in favour of a view that they arise from discrepancies in 
the models applied by different CRAs, i.e. split corporate ratings arise from the fact that 
CRAs apply different models and consider the factors with different levels of importance. 
Morgan (2002) reports that financial intermediaries are more susceptible to split ratings than 
industrials and utilities, and attributes this to a higher degree of opacity. Banks’ information 
opacity is reflected by their asset mix, including loans and trading assets. Iannotta (2006) and 
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Flannery et al. (2004) also provide evidence on the relevance of banks’ asset opacity. 
Livingston et al. (2007) and Hyytinen and Parajinen (2008) examine the opacity of non-
financial firms and they find similar results. Livingston et al. (2007) claim that firms’ opacity 
is not only reflected by their internal accounting data but also by external factors such as the 
number of equity analysts and the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Bowe 
and Larik (2014) show that the split corporate ratings assigned by Moody’s and S&P can be 
predicted with firm-specific financial and governance characteristics such as size, 
profitability and percentage of independent directors.  
In contrast with split corporate ratings, very few papers exist on the determinants of 
split sovereign ratings. Cantor and Packer (1996a) emphasize the prevalence of split 
sovereign ratings, but they do not investigate the causes. Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012) 
examine some possible causes of split sovereign ratings, but are restricted to emerging 
markets. They find that CRAs use different quantitative factors and place different weights on 
these factors. CRAs disagree more on speculative-grade rated sovereigns, and smaller CRAs 
tend to rate issuers in their “home region” more favourably.  
In this paper, we use a richer dataset comprising both developed and developing 
countries. We are the first to examine the relevance of the information opacity hypothesis in 
explaining split sovereign ratings, considering two key sources of opacity, namely: quality of 
information disclosure by governments and political risk. Further, we evaluate split sovereign 
ratings in a different way than prior literature. We consider the extent to which a rating 
difference between two CRAs varies within a year, captured by the annual standard deviation 
of daily rating differences (sd.split).   
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3. Hypotheses 
To explore the drivers of split sovereign ratings, we examine the following hypotheses: 
Null hypothesis H0 - 'Random error hypothesis': Split sovereign credit ratings 
between CRAs occur randomly due to the complicated, subjective nature of sovereign credit 
risk assessments.  
Alternative hypothesis H1 - ‘Opacity hypothesis': Split sovereign ratings are a 
consequence of sovereign information opacity. 
We use two proxies of opacity: information disclosure and political risk, and therefore test 
the following hypotheses: 
H2 - ‘Information disclosure hypothesis’: Split sovereign ratings are influenced by the 
quality of information disclosure by governments on both political and financial/economic 
aspects. 
H3 - ‘Political risk hypothesis’: Split sovereign ratings are a consequence of political 
risk, which is a significant element of sovereign credit risk assessment, but is difficult to 
observe and measure in an objective manner. 
 
Ederington (1986) tests the 'random error hypothesis' through a set of tests on the 
alternative hypothesis that Moody’s and S&P adopt different rating standards and/or attach 
different weights to a common set of quantitative determinants of corporate default risk. 
Ederington (1986) shows that CRAs assign similar weights to the commonly used factors, 
e.g. firm size and leverage ratio, in estimating the credit risks. Ederington (1986) asserts that 
split corporate ratings arise randomly because rating is a subjective and difficult task. This 
implies that split ratings are symmetric between any pair of CRAs, and thus we should not 
observe a persistent trend of either higher ratings or lower ratings from a particular CRA. 
We apply a similar approach to Ederington (1986) and Livingston et al (2007) by 
setting up tests on the alternative hypotheses. Rejection of the ‘opacity hypothesis' implies 
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support for the validity of the 'random error hypothesis'. The literature suggests a significant 
linkage between information opacity and split ratings for banks and corporates (e.g. Morgan, 
2002; Livingston et al., 2007; Hyytinen and Parajinen, 2008). We contribute to prior 
literature by testing the information opacity hypothesis (H1) for sovereign issuers. 
In sovereign credit risk assessments, CRAs encounter opacity when information 
disclosure is poor or important input data are difficult to measure. Regarding the first proxy 
of opacity (under H2), we claim that rating assessments depend on the sovereigns’ 
information transparency. Government agencies are usually responsible for compiling and 
releasing information about their activities, policies, intentions and other capabilities. 
Macroeconomic statistics are also under the control of governments. Government 
transparency is reflected by the “legal, political and institutional structures that make the 
information about the internal characteristics of a government and society available to actors 
both inside and outside of the domestic political system…” (Finel and Lord, 1999). Gelos and 
Wei (2005) document two aspects of government transparency, namely: the macroeconomic 
policy transparency and the data transparency. We adopt the second aspect of transparency 
from Gelos and Wei (2005) which refers to the timeliness and frequency with which a 
government releases macroeconomic data. We extend this to cover all the information about 
the government’s characteristics, activities and intentions that are needed for rating sovereign 
creditworthiness. The ‘information disclosure hypothesis’ (H2) is tested using a proxy 
variable (Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), see Section 4.2.1). 
With regards to the second aspect of opacity (H3), we draw from the CRAs’ rating 
methodologies. CRAs explicitly state the key factors considered in rating sovereign 
creditworthiness. These comprise different quantitative and qualitative variables, with typical 
categories being: macroeconomic development, public finance, external finance, the 
soundness of the financial systems, political risk, and others. Unlike the other commonly used 
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credit risk determinants, political risk poses a difficulty due to the lack of consistently 
observable and unbiased measures. Hence, H3 tests whether political risk is a substantial 
component of information opacity through which split sovereign ratings arise. We test H3 
using a proxy variable (the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), see Section 4.2.2) to 
measure the degree of sovereigns’ political risk.  
In examining H1, we particularly focus on two groups of countries. The first group is 
European countries, where split ratings have become more common (primarily driven by the 
recent sovereign debt crisis), yet they display relatively low political risk.
4
 In addition, our 
sample period coincides with the evolution and expansion of the European Union which is 
believed to reinforce government transparency among its member states. Further, the credit 
standing of European governments can be affected by their strong regional, trade and 
financial links and the high degree of integration as well as joint economic and monetary 
policy among the Eurozone member states. Therefore, we expect the determinants of split 
ratings for European countries to have some unique characteristics.  
The second group includes non-European countries (the rest of the world (ROTW) 
group), which mainly constitutes emerging countries
5
, which are characterised by a relative 
lack of political stability, lack of market regulation and transparency, and a higher degree of 
volatility and uncertainty. Many rating actions in emerging countries are driven by political 
events, e.g. the downgrades of Egypt, Bahrain and Tunisia in the wake of the ‘Arab spring’ in 
                                                          
4
 However, political risk is high on the recent European agenda. CRAs have warned of negative rating actions 
on European sovereigns as a result of heightened political uncertainty. This is driven by, for example, the 
ongoing migration crisis, the risk of the UK leaving the EU leading to credit market volatility, an escalation in 
extreme and nationalistic views and the rise of anti-reform political parties, which challenge Europe's fragile 
growth and financial stability (Moody’s, 2015; S&P, 2015; Fitch, 2016). 
5
 Around three-quarters of the observed split sovereign ratings in the ROTW group are related to emerging 
countries (according to the World Bank definition). We also present results based on emerging countries outside 
Europe (See Table 7 and Section 5.2). 
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2011, and the downgrade of Brazil to speculative-grade by S&P and Moody’s in February 
2016 caused by political turmoil hampering efforts to make fiscal adjustments. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1. The sovereign credit rating data  
The sovereign credit rating dataset is collected directly from CRAs’ publications. It 
includes daily observations of long-term foreign currency issuer ratings, outlook and watch 
for 64 sovereigns jointly rated by at least two of the largest CRAs, namely S&P, Moody's and 
Fitch. Due to availability of information on the explanatory variables, the data spans from 1
st
 
January 1997 to 30
th
 September 2011 for joint ratings by S&P-Moody’s, and from 1st January 
1998 to 30
th
 September 2011 for joint ratings by Fitch-S&P and Fitch-Moody’s. 
We convert the sovereign rating letter grades into a 58-point numerical rating scale 
(see Sy, 2004). Adjacent notches on the 20-notch rating scale differ by 3 points on the 58-
point scale (AAA/Aaa = 58, AA+/Aa1 = 55 … CCC-/Caa3 = 4, CC/Ca to C/SD/D = 1). We 
then adjust the ratings either upward or downward by one (two) point(s) if outlook (watch) is 
assigned respectively with either positive or negative indication. We refer to these adjusted 
ratings as comprehensive credit ratings (CCR). We define daily rating differences as the daily 
differences in CCR between two CRAs. Non-zero differences indicate daily split ratings. A 
split by three-CCR points is equivalent to a one-notch split, while a split by one (two)-
CCR(s) is equivalent to a split by an outlook (watch) status. This method enables us to 
evaluate not only the notch differences but also the outlook and watch differences. This has 
not been previously implemented in the split ratings literature. For the remainder of this 
paper, the term ‘ratings’ refers to comprehensive credit ratings (CCR) and the term ‘rating 
differences’ refers to the differences in CCR.  
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      Table 1 details the data summary of daily split sovereign ratings. There are 61, 54 and 52 
sovereigns with joint ratings assigned by S&P versus Moody’s, S&P versus Fitch, and 
Moody’s versus Fitch. In line with Cantor and Packer (1996a) and Alsakka and ap Gwilym 
(2012), split ratings are very common in the samples. The proportions of the split ratings 
range from 53.3% to 67.3%. S&P and Fitch disagree less often than they do with Moody's, 
and the magnitude of their average rating differences is slightly smaller.  
      Figure 1 presents the distributions of daily split sovereign ratings. Most of the daily rating 
disagreements range between 1-CCR to 6-CCR points, which is consistent with Hill et al. 
(2010) who report that sovereign ratings usually differ by one or two notches on the 20-notch 
rating scale. Split ratings of 3-CCR points or below account for around 45% of observations. 
Large splits of >3 CCR-points are more common in the case of the S&P-Moody’s sample, 
with S&P being the more conservative CRA. Similarly, S&P tends to assign lower ratings 
than Fitch, though the magnitudes of the splits are more concentrated at ≤ 3-CCR points.  
       Table 1 and Figure 1 show that the split sovereign ratings are not symmetric between any 
pair of CRAs, but instead the differences are more lopsided, with S&P tending to be on the 
downside. This pattern suggests that split sovereign ratings are not caused by random errors. 
It is also consistent with the findings of Morgan (2002) and Livingston et al. (2007) that split 
corporate ratings are lopsided, and thus is consistent with the opacity hypothesis. However, 
for corporate ratings Moody’s typically assigns the lower ratings. 
       Our sample comprises 26 countries in Europe
6
 and 38 countries outside this region. 
Table 1 shows that rating differences across the three CRAs are dispersed widely both inside 
and outside Europe. However, the average daily rating differences are larger in Europe than 
in the rest of the world (ROTW), implying harsher split ratings between CRAs in Europe. 
This is partly attributable to multiple-notch rating downgrades, especially during the 
                                                          
6
 The European country selection is initially based on the World Bank’s ‘Europe and Central Asia’ region, and 
the final qualifying countries include 24 countries in Europe plus Kazakhstan and Russia.  
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sovereign debt crisis. Moody’s disagrees on the credit quality of European countries with 
S&P and Fitch less often than they do on sovereigns in the rest of the world. Yet, for joint 
ratings by S&P and Fitch, European countries have more split ratings. Fitch tends to be more 
generous than Moody’s in European countries, while slightly harsher in ROTW countries.7   
In studying split ratings, it is important to consider time variation arising due to 
different frequencies and timing of rating actions across CRAs. Observing split ratings at 
specific points in time (e.g. debt issuance) fails to pick this up. In order to retain the benefits 
of a rich dataset, we calculate the annual standard deviation of (daily values of) rating 
differences between two CRAs (sd.split). This measure captures well the degree to which 
CRAs’ opinions divide on sovereign credit quality. It also circumvents the problems 
encountered by other split measures such as the annual average of daily rating differences, for 
which positive and negative observations can cancel out. By using standard deviation, we 
give added weight to large and volatile split ratings. 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of annual sd.split. A similar picture to daily 
split ratings reported in Table 1 emerges. The average levels of dispersion of daily rating 
differences across the years fall between 0.5-CCR and 0.6-CCR points. S&P vs. Fitch 
presents a slightly lower degree of dispersion than the other two pairs. Approximately 60% of 
S&P vs. Fitch sd.split observations are non zero, compared with 55% (58%) for Moody’s vs. 
Fitch (S&P). Disagreements between CRAs vary greatly, whereby sd.split reaches a 
maximum of 7-CCR points. We find that daily splits between CRAs are more stable (lower 
average sd.split and lower percentage of non-zero sd.split) in Europe than in ROTW.  
 
 
                                                          
7
 This is an interesting observation because Fitch has dual headquarters (US and Europe), while Moody’s and 
S&P have headquarters in the US only. Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012) document a ‘home bias effect’ by 
smaller CRAs. 
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4.2. Opacity variables 
4.2.1. Quality of information disclosure by governments 
The first variable that we use to evaluate sovereign opacity is the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA). An FOIA is often established to promote the free flow of 
information from governmental bodies to the public domain. It contains provisions for the 
government’s responsibility to compile, release and update information regularly or at the 
request of individuals and institutions. FOIA reflects an important part of the legal 
mechanism to facilitate ease of access to government information. Although FOIAs might 
differ in content and scope from country to country, most of them reflect a government’s 
commitment to guarantee and improve transparency. Therefore, we contend that FOIAs are a 
good signal of government transparency and effectively capture the concept of government 
information disclosure (see Section 3 - H2). 
We obtain information on FOIA from the report named “Overview of all FOI laws” in 
Vleugels (2011). For the purpose of this research, the countries either without FOI law or 
which have introduced but not yet passed the law are categorized as “not having FOIA”. We 
define the countries where the law has been passed as “having FOIA”. However, the “having 
FOIA” status does not imply that all the countries in this category have the same level of 
government transparency, as the content and implementation of the laws will vary across 
countries. We do not have information on the content of FOIA in each country, so we rely on 
the length of time the law has been enacted to evaluate government transparency for the 
countries in this category. We claim that there is a variation in information transparency 
between the countries where FOIA has been in place for some time and the countries where 
the law is new. The mere recent introduction of FOIA into a nation’s legal framework does 
not assure its citizens of immediate free access to information from public agencies. 
Government transparency takes time to improve as effective implementation is not immediate 
15 
 
after the law has been passed. Therefore, we define FOIA as a discrete variable with six 
ordered outcomes. It takes the value of 1 if the sovereign is “not having FOIA”, 2 if the 
sovereign has adopted FOIA for less than five years, 3 if for more than five years and less 
than 10 years, 4 if for more than 10 years and less than 15 years, 5 if for more than 15 years 
and less than 20 years, and 6 if for more than 20 years.
8
 We argue that information disclosure 
improves sovereign transparency, mitigates the opacity problem, and reduces the variation in 
daily split ratings. Therefore, we expect FOIA score to be negatively correlated with the split 
ratings. 
Table 3 presents the summary statistics. The overall average FOIA is 2.2, equivalent 
to one to five years’ experience in implementing the FOI laws. There are a few exceptional 
cases including Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the United States where the FOIA has been 
adopted for over 20 years prior to the start of the sample period. Among the 64 countries in 
the sample, 21 do not have legislation on access to information for the entire sample period. 
 
4.2.2. Political risk 
The second variable that we use to evaluate sovereign opacity is political risk. Unlike 
macroeconomic and public finance indicators, there is not a standard method to quantify 
political risk, therefore assessment is mostly opinion-based. To test H3, we use six Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) estimated by the World Bank as proxy variables for political 
risk. Each indicator corresponds to one of six different aspects of governance, which are 
control of corruption, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, 
voice and accountability, regulatory quality, and rule of law. Higher governance scores imply 
lower political risk. The extent to which CRAs align their sovereign rating actions with 
changes in political risk reflect their differing rating approaches, hence split ratings occur. 
                                                          
8
 The results are not sensitive to alternative definitions of FOIA using other time thresholds.  
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Whenever political risk is more complicated to evaluate, the harder it is for CRAs to estimate 
default probability. Therefore, we expect a negative correlation between WGI and the 
variation of daily split ratings.  
Table 3 presents the summary statistics. The overall means of the six political variables 
vary from 0.13 to 0.5 with standard deviations in the range of 0.86 to 1.02. In terms of rule of 
law, the top sovereigns are Finland, New Zealand, Germany, Japan and Singapore. In 
contrast, Cameroon, Belarus, Guatemala, Paraguay and Ecuador have the lowest scores. We 
also calculate a composite of all the six different aspects of governance (Ave WGI). Finland, 
Denmark, Iceland, Germany and Ireland are the sovereigns with top Ave WGI scores, while 
Belarus, Pakistan, Cameroon, Paraguay and Ecuador score the lowest Ave WGI. 
 
4.3. Empirical model 
We estimate the following panel data regression model with fixed-effects for the three 
pairs of CRAs separately, for the full sample as well as for two subsamples (Europe and 
ROTW countries):  
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sd.splitit: the standard deviation of daily split ratings of sovereign i during year t.  
FOIAit: the proxy of the government’s quality of information disclosure for sovereign i at 
year t. FOIA is defined as a discrete variable with six ordered outcomes (see Section 4.2.1). 
WGIit-1: the political risk (Worldwide Governance Indicator) score of sovereign i at year t-1 
(see Section 4.2.2).  
Default dummy: a binary variable that equals 1 if the sovereign has experienced sovereign 
defaults or debt restructuring, and zero otherwise.  
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Domestic credit/GDP: annual loans to the private sector as a proportion of GDP.  
Reserves/imports: the annual dollar amount of foreign exchange reserves relative to payments 
for imports.  
GDP growth: the 3-year average real growth in Gross Domestic Product.  
Inflation: the 3-year average rate of general price appreciation.  
CA balance/GDP: the 3-year average of current account balance as a proportion of GDP.  
Fiscal balance/GDP: the 3-year average of the fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP.  
Government debt/GDP: the gross government debt in US dollar as a percentage of GDP.  
These eight economic and financial indicators are used to control for the differences in the 
CRAs’ rating methodologies.9 The inference for these variables helps uncover discrepancies 
in sovereign credit rating models across the CRAs. We select these variables by reference to 
CRAs’ publications on credit rating models, and published research on the determinants of 
sovereign credit ratings (e.g. Cantor and Packer, 1996b; Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, 2005; 
Afonso et al., 2011). We lag these variables by one year, except for GDP growth, Inflation, 
Current Account Balance/GDP and Fiscal Balance/GDP which are averaged over three 
previous years to account for the economic cycle.  
Specgrade_dumit: a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the average annual rating 
assigned by two CRAs for sovereign i at year t is at speculative-grade (BB+/Ba1 and lower). 
This controls for the different characteristics that speculative-grade vs. investment-grade 
rating categories may have, and hence examines whether split ratings are more common 
among low-rated countries than high-rated countries. 
We apply Huber-White robust standard errors to obtain robust estimators to any 
potential heteroscedasticity and/or autocorrelation in the residuals. Following Arellano’s 
                                                          
9
 These macroeconomic and financial fundamentals are obtained from Datastream. The sources are IMF 
International Financial Statistics, IMF World Economic Outlook, and Oxford Economics. See Table 3 for the 
summary statistics.  
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(1993) approach, we perform a heteroscedasticity robust-form of Hausman test (unreported) 
on imposing random effects vs. fixed effects on our model and the test results support fixed-
effects models. The fixed-effects are captured by a series of country dummy variables 
iCo  
and year dummy variables
tYr .
10
  
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. The full sample 
Table 4 presents the results of Eq. (1). We examine each pair of CRAs with separate 
estimations. WGI indicators are strongly positively correlated to each other (Kaufmann et al., 
2010). The correlation matrix (unreported) shows that the average correlation between two 
WGI is 0.815. Therefore, we repeat each regression six times with six different WGI, and the 
results are relatively consistent across the six versions, as would be expected. Therefore, we 
choose “Rule of Law” to present political risk in Tables 4 - 8. 11 In addition, we estimate Eq. 
(1) using the average of these six WGI (following Butler and Fauver, 2006).
12
 
Table 4 also reports the results of a base, simple model that only includes sovereign 
fundamentals, while excluding the opacity proxies (FOIA and WGI). The purpose of fitting 
the base model and the full model (Eq. 1) is to unravel the economic significance of 
sovereign opacity in explaining why split ratings occur. The base model is also relevant later 
in Section 5.3.  
Among the macroeconomic variables, split ratings are mostly influenced by changes 
in the public finance variable (Government Debt/GDP). Specifically, a one percentage point 
                                                          
10
 We have tested whether WGI and FOIA are endogenous variables using ‘difference-in-Hansen’ tests (Hansen, 
1982). The tests confirm exogeneity in all estimations. 
11
 We observe that statistical inferences for most individual coefficients and the models’ overall significance do 
not vary substantially across the six choices of WGI. The result tables when using the other five WGI are 
available on request from the authors.  
12
 The correlation matrix has been considered and VIF tests have been conducted, and we find no evidence of 
multicollinearity for other explanatory variables. 
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increase in the ratio of government debt over GDP increases the variation of splits by      
0.01-CCR-point. Table 4 also highlights that the total Domestic Credit is a statistically 
significant factor in explaining split sovereign ratings, but the magnitude of the impact is 
relatively small in economic terms. Consistent with Livingston et al. (2007), we find that split 
ratings between S&P and Fitch are more likely for speculative-grade than for investment-
grade rated sovereigns.  
In contrast with most of the economic variables, opacity variables are statistically and 
economically significant in explaining the split sovereign ratings. We find that political risk 
(WGI) is more influential than information transparency (FOIA).
13
 WGI is the most important 
factor for split ratings. For all three pairs of CRAs, a unit decrease in political score increases 
the sd.split between the two CRAs by 0.5-CCR to 0.6-CCR point. Split sovereign ratings 
between Moody’s and Fitch are slightly more affected by opaque sovereigns (with higher 
degree of political risk) than the split ratings between the other pairs. We find a slightly 
stronger impact of political risk when using the average of six WGI scores as the proxy for 
political risk than when using an individual indicator (rule of law). Further, the R-squared 
values are larger for the estimations that include FOIA and WGI than those without opacity 
indicators. The results support H1 (and H3 in particular) that split ratings are more prevalent 
when opacity arises, especially with regard to political risk.  
 
5.2. Regional analysis: Europe and the rest of the world. 
In this section, we conduct further analysis of the causes of split sovereign ratings for 
countries in and outside the European region. Specifically, the objective is to unravel the 
potential differences in the determinants of split sovereign ratings between countries in 
Europe and the rest of the world (ROTW). Persistent split ratings have become common, 
particularly in many high-income countries affected by the recent European sovereign debt 
                                                          
13
 We do not find evidence supporting the information disclosure hypothesis (H2) in the full sample.  
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crisis. Further, for the ROTW group, we estimate Eq. (1) for a sub-group consisting of 
emerging countries only. Table 5 presents the results for European countries, Table 6 for 
ROTW countries, and Table 7 for the ROTW-emerging countries sub-group. 
The effects of political risk on split sovereign ratings are concentrated in ROTW 
countries where WGI governance scores are lower. Table 6 shows that a one unit decrease in 
WGI (rule of law) increases the sd.split by 0.70, 0.96 and 1.07 CCR-point in the case of 
Moody’s-S&P, S&P-Fitch and Moody’s-Fitch, respectively. The coefficient estimates are 
larger (0.79, 1.31 and 1.35 CCR-point) when we use the composite governance score 
(average of the six WGI). Table 5 shows that the effects of political risk on split ratings are 
muted in Europe.
14
 The political uncertainty in Europe has become a more important factor in 
the post-2010 period, and therefore is not apparent during most of our sample period. Table 5 
also shows that split sovereign ratings increase if a government fails to meet its financial 
obligations in full and on time.  
We find a strong and significant effect of political risk on split ratings in ROTW 
countries. However, the evidence for FOIA is still absent. We run Eq. (1) using a sub-set of 
the group ROTW excluding developed countries and present the results in Table 7. The 
results continue to support our hypothesis of sovereign opacity with regards to political risk 
(H3). We also find significant coefficients on the FOIA variable in the case of Moody’s vs. 
Fitch. Longer establishment of a Freedom of Information Act in emerging countries 
decreases split ratings between Moody’s and Fitch. The sd.split falls by 0.2-CCR point for 
sovereigns that have adopted FOIA for up to five years compared with sovereigns that have 
no FOIA in place.  
                                                          
14
 In unreported results, we find that the ‘political stability’ WGI indicator in the case of S&P-Moody’s, and 
‘control for corruption’ and ‘government effectiveness’ WGI indicators in the case of S&P-Fitch have 
significant impact on split ratings in the anticipated direction. 
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        To sum up, there is evidence supporting sovereign opacity in determining split sovereign 
ratings (H1), and we reject the null hypothesis that split sovereign ratings occur randomly. 
Our results are in line with the literature on split corporate ratings (Livingston et al., 2007) 
and split bank ratings (Morgan, 2002). We evaluate sovereign opacity from the perspective of 
both political risk and the quality of information disclosure by governments. Sovereign 
opacity exaggerates the division of credit opinions between CRAs, and political risk is an 
important factor behind this, particularly in countries outside Europe, providing evidence to 
support H3. Lack of good quality data in emerging countries is encountered by rating analysts 
when the country of interest does not have legislation to support the disclosure of information 
about the government. In that circumstance, it is hard for CRAs to form credit opinions and 
split ratings are more likely to occur. Our empirical analysis supports this argument, and 
hence H2, in the case of split sovereign ratings between Moody’s and Fitch in emerging 
countries outside Europe.  
 
5.3. Economic significance of sovereign opacity 
5.3.1. Likelihood ratio test 
 We perform a test on the collective explanatory power of opacity variables (FOIA and 
WGI) in explaining split ratings. The test is based on a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test statistic 
with two restrictions on FOIA and WGI. The LR statistic is given by ‘-2 ln (L0/L1)’ where L1 
is the value of the likelihood function for the un-nested full model that includes all the 
variables with unconstrained coefficients (see Eq. 1) and L0 is the value of the likelihood 
function for the nested model in which coefficients on FOIA and WGI are restricted to zero. 
The LR statistic follows a Chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to two (the 
number of constraints imposed).
15 The results are presented in Panel A of Table 8.  
                                                          
15
 The estimation of LR is based on a maximum likelihood (ML). The coefficient estimates and inference on the 
explanatory variables of Eq. (1) in Tables 4-7 are unchanged when using ML. 
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We find that opacity variables significantly improve the fit of the model. The LR 
statistics are more significant in the cases of S&P/Moody’s vs. Fitch than for S&P vs. 
Moody’s. Unlike for ROTW countries, opacity variables do not help in improving the 
explanatory power of the model for European countries.
16
 For a sub-group of ROTW-
emerging countries, where our empirical results highlight a significant role of FOIA, we also 
find support from the LR test. 
 
5.3.2. Out-of-sample prediction analysis 
 This section presents an out-of-sample prediction analysis. We compare the predictive 
power of a full model (Eq. 1) incorporating two opacity variables (WGI and FOIA) and a 
restricted base model without opacity variables (and only including macroeconomic and 
financial indicators). The purpose of such analysis is to unravel the importance of opacity in 
improving the performance of an empirical model of split sovereign ratings. We estimate the 
base model (without WGI and FOIA) and the full model (including WGI and FOIA) using a 
data sample from 1997 to 2006, and use 2007 to 2011 as the hold-out period. The forecast of 
sd.split is produced for the hold-out period using coefficients estimated from the estimation 
period. The mean absolute and mean squared errors (deviations of actual values from their 
forecast values) are compared between the base and full models, and the results are presented 
in Panel B of Table 8. We find that the full model in which opacity variables are included 
outperforms the base model for the three pairs of CRAs, particularly in the cases of sub-
sample analyses. The evidence is more robust in the case of Moody’s vs. Fitch.  
 
 
 
                                                          
16
 Unreported results show significant LR statistics for three WGIs: control of corruption, government 
effectiveness, and political stability (see footnote 14). 
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6. Conclusions 
The paper examines the causes of split sovereign ratings using a large dataset of 
ratings, outlook and watch assignments by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch for 64 sovereigns during 
the period 1997-2011. To best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that relates opacity to 
split ratings for sovereign issuers. Prior literature documents that opacity raises the 
probability of split corporate and bank ratings (Morgan, 2002; Iannotta, 2006, Livingston et 
al., 2007). We focus on two key sources of opacity in assessing sovereign credit ratings: the 
quality of information disclosure by governments (proxied by Freedom of Information Acts 
(FOIA)) and political risk (proxied by Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)). 
We find that more opaque sovereigns are more likely to have split ratings. Split 
sovereign ratings are not symmetric for CRA pairs, with S&P tending to be the most 
conservative. This suggests that split sovereign ratings are not attributable to random errors, 
thus supporting the opacity hypothesis. We also highlight that opacity variables significantly 
improve the fit of the model and increase its out-of-sample predictive power. 
We find that political risk plays a highly significant role in explaining split sovereign 
ratings. Compared with economic variables, political risk has a much stronger impact on split 
sovereign ratings. The three CRAs are affected by political risk, though Fitch appears to be 
more influenced by this factor relative to the other CRAs. Sovereigns with higher political 
risk are more likely to have split ratings, particularly in countries outside Europe. Political 
uncertainty in Europe is a major current issue but only came to the fore after our sample 
period. 
We also show that lack of government transparency in emerging countries outside 
Europe increases split sovereign ratings between Moody’s and Fitch. We do not find similar 
effects of information disclosure in European countries, where the right to access information 
has long been ensured by legislation on freedom of information. Enhancing the quantity and 
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quality of data for credit assessment purposes can help mitigate the opacity problem, and thus 
reduce split ratings in emerging countries. In this respect, our study does not only support the 
recent proposals (e.g. House of Lords, 2011) encouraging the engagement of government 
authorities with the CRAs, but also calls for establishing legal and institutional frameworks 
that promote credible and timely information disclosure to improve ratings quality. 
The study will be of interest to many sovereign borrowers and bond investors since it 
provides clear insights on rating differences across the three largest CRAs. There are also 
considerable benefits and economic significance for countries to undertake reforms to reduce 
political uncertainty. Further, our study emphasizes the importance of enhancing the quality 
of data for political as well as financial and economic aspects about the country. Our findings 
are consistent with the recent evidence on the pricing of split-rated bonds (e.g. Livingston and 
Zhou, 2010; Livingston et al., 2010; Vu et al. 2015), therefore sovereign issuers should be 
more open and willing to share information with the CRAs since the reward for this is lower 
borrowing costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
References 
Afonso, A., Furceri, D., Gomes, P., 2012. Sovereign credit ratings and financial market 
linkages: Application to European data. Journal of International Money and Finance 31, 
606-638. 
Afonso, A., Gomes, P., Rother, P., 2011. Short- and long-run determinants of sovereign debt 
credit ratings. International Journal of Finance and Economics 16, 1-15. 
Alsakka, R., ap Gwilym, O., 2012. The extent and causes of split sovereign ratings.  
Emerging Markets Finance and Trade 48, 4-24. 
Arellano, M. 1993. On the testing of correlated effects with panel data. Journal of 
Econometrics 59, 87-97.  
Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, E., 2005. An analysis of the determinants of sovereign ratings. 
Global Finance Journal 15, 251-280. 
Bongaerts, D., Cremers, K., Goetzmann, W., 2012. Tiebreaker: Certification and multiple 
credit ratings. Journal of Finance 67, 113-152. 
Bowe, M., Larik, W., 2014. Split ratings and differences in corporate credit rating policy 
between Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. The Financial Review 49, 713-734. 
Butler, A., Fauver, L., 2006. Institutional environment and sovereign credit ratings. Financial 
Management 35, 53-79. 
Cantor, R., Packer, F., 1996a. Sovereign risk assessment and agency credit ratings. European 
Financial Management 2, 247-256. 
Cantor, R., Packer, F., 1996b. Determinants and impacts of sovereign credit ratings. 
Economic Policy Review 2, 37-53. 
Cavallo, E., Powell, A., Rigobon, R., 2013. Do credit ratings agencies add value? Evidence 
from the sovereign rating business. International Journal of Finance and Economics 18, 
240-265. 
Christopher, R., Kim S. J., Wu, E., 2012. Do sovereign credit ratings influence regional stock 
and bond market interdependencies in emerging countries? Journal of International 
Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 22, 1070-1089. 
Ederington, L.H., 1986. Why split ratings occur. Financial Management 15, 37–47.  
European Commission, 2009. Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on credit rating agencies. Official Journal of the 
European Union 302/1 (2009). 
26 
 
Ferreira, M., Gama, P., 2007. Does sovereign debt ratings news spill over to international 
stock markets? Journal of Banking and Finance 31, 3162-3182. 
Finel, B. I., Lord, K., 1999. The surprising logic of transparency. International Studies 
Quarterly 43, 325-339. 
Fitch, 2016. Europe’s Troubled Politics and Uncertain Future. February 2016. 
Flannery, M. J., Kwan, S. H., Nimalendran, M., 2004. Market evidence on the opaqueness of 
banking firms’ assets. Journal of Financial Economics 71, 419-460. 
Fuertes, A. M., Kalotychou, E., 2007. On sovereign credit migration: A study of alternative 
estimators and rating dynamics. Computational Statistics and Data Analysis 51, 3448-69. 
Gande, A., Parsley, D., 2005. News spillovers in the sovereign debt market. Journal of 
Financial Economics 75, 691-734. 
Gelos, R. G., Wei, S. J., 2005. Transparency and international portfolio holdings. Journal of 
Finance 60, 2987-3020. 
Hansen, L.P., 1982. Large sample properties of generalized method of moments estimators. 
Econometrica 50, 1029-1054.  
Hill, P., Brooks, R., Faff, R., 2010. Variations in sovereign credit quality assessments across 
rating agencies. Journal of Banking and Finance 34, 1327-1343. 
House of Lords, 2011. Sovereign credit ratings: Shooting the messenger? European Union 
Committee, 21
st
 Report of Session 2010-2012, HL Paper 189, London, UK. 
Hyytinen, A., Pajarinen, M., 2008. Opacity of young businesses: Evidence from rating 
disagreements. Journal of Banking and Finance 32, 1234-1241. 
Iannotta, G., 2006. Testing for opaqueness in the European banking industry: Evidence from 
bond credit ratings. Journal of Financial Services Research 30, 287-309. 
Jewell, J., Livingston, M., 1998. Split ratings, bond yields, and underwriter spreads for 
industrial bonds. Journal of Financial Research 21, 185-204. 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M., 2010. The worldwide governance indicators: 
Methodology and analytical issues. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5430. 
Kim, S. J., Wu, E., 2011. International bank flows to emerging markets: Influence of 
sovereign credit ratings and their regional spillover effects. Journal of Financial Research 
34, 331–364. 
Livingston, M., Naranjo, A., Zhou, L., 2007. Asset opaqueness and split bond ratings. 
Financial Management 36, 49-62. 
27 
 
Livingston, M., Naranjo, A., Zhou, L., 2008. Split bond ratings and rating migration. Journal 
of Banking and Finance 32, 1613-1624. 
Livingston, M., Wei, J., Zhou, L., 2010. Moody’s and S&P ratings: Are they equivalent? 
Conservative ratings and split rated bond yields. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 
42, 1267-1293. 
Livingston, M., Zhou, L., 2010. Split bond ratings and information opacity premiums. 
Financial Management 39, 515-532. 
Mählmann, T., 2009. Multiple credit ratings, cost of debt and self-selection. Journal of 
Business Finance and Accounting 36, 1228-1251. 
Mellios, C., Paget-Blanc, E., 2006. Which factors determine sovereign credit ratings? 
European Journal of Finance 12, 361-377. 
Moody’s, 2015. Outlook: Sovereign-Global. Stable Outlook Despite Low Growth, Jittery 
Markets and Uneven Reforms. November 2015.  
Morgan, D. P., 2002. Rating banks: Risk and uncertainty in an opaque industry. American 
Economic Review 92, 874-888. 
Pástor, Ľ. and Veronesi, P., 2013. Political uncertainty and risk premia. Journal of Financial 
Economics 110, 520-545.  
Pottier, S. W., Sommer, D. W., 1999. Property-liability insurer financial strength ratings: 
Differences across rating agencies. Journal of Risk and Insurance 66, 621-642. 
S&P, 2015. Credit Conditions: Growth In Europe Is On Track, But Geopolitical Risks Have 
Risen. 2
nd
 December 2015. 
Sy, A., 2004. Rating the rating agencies: Anticipating currency crises or debt crises?. Journal 
of Banking and Finance 28, 2845-2867. 
Vleugels, R., 2011. Overview of all FOI laws. Fringe Special, October 2011.  
Vu, H., Alsakka, R., ap Gwilym, O., 2015. The credit signals that matter most for sovereign 
bond spreads with split rating. Journal of International Money and Finance 53, 174-191. 
Williams, G., Alsakka, R., ap Gwilym, O., 2013. The impact of sovereign rating actions on 
bank ratings in emerging markets. Journal of Banking and Finance 37, 563-577. 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics and distributions of daily rating differences 
 
No of obs. Countries Mean S.D. Min Max 
<= -1 CCR 
(%) 
0 CCR 
(%) 
>= 1 CCR 
(%) 
Panel A.  S&P versus Moody's 
Full sample 213,182 61 -0.66 3.12 -20 11 40.11 32.73 27.16 
Europe 92,996 26 -1.27 3.20 -20 10 45.94 35.44 18.62 
ROTW 120,186 35 -0.19 2.98 -15 11 35.59 30.64 33.77 
Panel B.  S&P versus Fitch 
Full sample 188,303 54 -0.24 2.40 -15 18 31.56 46.69 21.75 
Europe 89,653 24 -0.37 2.18 -15 6 33.62 43.65 22.73 
ROTW 98,650 30 -0.12 2.58 -15 18 29.69 49.45 20.85 
Panel C. Moody’s versus Fitch 
Full sample 183,390 52 0.56 3.03 -12 17 25.30 40.47 34.22 
Europe 89,949 24 0.96 2.80 -10 15 15.62 47.36 37.01 
ROTW 93,441 28 0.17 3.19 -12 17 34.62 33.84 31.54 
     This table presents the descriptive statistics and distribution of daily split sovereign ratings between S&P, 
Moody's and Fitch for the full sample and subsamples of European countries (‘Europe’) and the rest of the 
world (‘ROTW’); see footnote #6 for the definition of countries. We compute the daily differences using the 58-
point comprehensive credit ratings (CCR) between two credit rating agencies (CRA) for each sovereign on each 
business day. Rating differences are observed over a period from Jan 1997 to Sep 2011 for joint ratings by 
Moody’s and S&P and from Jan 1998 to Sep 2011 for joint ratings by Fitch and S&P/Moody’s. Panel A reports 
ratings by S&P minus ratings by Moody’s. Panel B (C) reports ratings by S&P (Moody’s) minus ratings by 
Fitch. Columns ‘<=1 CCR (%)’ and ‘>=1 CCR (%)’ are the proportions of lower and higher, respectively, 
sovereign ratings by the first CRA than the second CRA to the total number of daily observations on the same 
row. Column ‘0 CCR (%)’ reports the proportion of equal ratings (i.e. non-split ratings) by both CRAs to the 
total number of observations. ‘Mean’ and ‘S.D.’ indicate the overall sample averages and standard deviations of 
daily split sovereign ratings. ‘Min’, ‘Max’ state the smallest and largest CCR differences.  
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Table 2. Summary statistics and distributions of the annual standard deviation of daily rating 
differences (sd.split) 
 
 No. of obs. Mean S.D. Min Max %>0 
Panel A.  S&P versus Moody's  
Full sample   834 0.62 0.87 0 7.12 58.75 
Europe  367 0.59 0.82 0 5.47 54.49 
ROTW  467 0.64 0.91 0 7.12 62.09 
Panel B.  S&P versus Fitch  
Full sample   686 0.56 0.75 0 6.62 59.91 
Europe  320 0.54 0.64 0 3.81 58.43 
ROTW  366 0.58 0.84 0 6.62 61.20 
Panel C. Moody’s versus Fitch  
Full sample  666 0.60 0.86 0 7.51 55.41 
Europe  320 0.59 0.85 0 5.72 50.63 
ROTW  346 0.61 0.86 0 7.51 59.82 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics and the distribution of annual standard deviations of daily rating differences 
(sd.split) between each pair of CRAs for the full sample and subsamples of European countries (‘Europe’) and the rest of 
the world (‘ROTW’). We compute the differences using the 58-point comprehensive credit ratings (CCR) between two 
credit rating agencies (CRA) for each sovereign on each business day. The standard deviations of daily CCR differences 
(sd.split) are calculated for each sovereign in each calendar year. Rating differences are observed over a period from Jan 
1997 to Sep 2011 for joint ratings by Moody’s and S&P and from Jan 1998 to Sep 2011 for joint ratings by Fitch and 
S&P/Moody’s. The numbers of countries are the same as reported in Table 1. Column ‘%> 0’ reports the proportion of 
non-zero sd.split to the total number of annual observations. 
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Table 3. Summary statistics of explanatory variables 
Variables Mean St. deviation Minimum Maximum 
FOIA (1-6) 2.24 1.64 1 6 
WGI (Control of Corruption ) 0.36 1.02 -1.45 2.59 
WGI (Government Effectiveness) 0.50 0.87 -1.17 2.37 
WGI (Political Stability) 0.13 0.89 -2.70 1.66 
WGI (Regulatory Quality) 0.53 0.78 -1.64 2.23 
WGI (Rule of Law) 0.37 0.91 -1.30 2.01 
WGI (Voice & Accountability) 0.41 0.86 -1.77 1.83 
Ave WGI  0.38 0.82 -1.14 1.98 
Default Dummy - - 0 1 
Domestic Credit/GDP (%) 72.32 55.12 0.33 319.46 
Reserves/Imports (%) 40.90 36.15 0.29 255.29 
GDP growth (%) 3.92 2.80 -7.51 12.73 
Inflation (%) 8.03 27.21 -1.06 719.22 
CA Balance/GDP (%) -1.32 6.28 -22.05 26.86 
Fiscal Balance/GDP (%) -2.06 3.46 -17.60 21.92 
Government debt/GDP (%) 50.46 30.71 3.69 215.95 
Speculative Grade Dummy - - 0 1 
This table reports the statistical properties of the variables used for explaining split sovereign ratings. There are 862 
annual observations of 64 sovereigns with joint rating from S&P, Moody's and Fitch over the period Jan 1997 - Sep 
2011. Time series of each sovereign are set equal to the total number of years within the period Jan 1997 - Sep 2011 
when the sovereign is rated by any two of the three CRAs. FOIA refers to for Freedom of Information Act. The FOIA 
variable takes discrete values between 1 and 6, depending on whether the sovereign has adopted legislation on access to 
information. A value of 1 is for the sovereigns without FOIA, value of 2 is for the sovereigns adopting the law for less 
than 5 years, value of 3 for between 5 and 10 years, value of 4 for between 10 and 15 years, value of 5 for between 15 
and 20 years, and value of 6 for above 20 years. Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) include six annual measures 
of governance from the World Bank, taking values from approximately -2.7 to +2.7. Ave WGI is the average of these six 
WGI scores. Higher values of WGIs indicate better governance. WGIs reflect the general political risk and institutional 
strength of the sovereigns in the sample. Default dummy is a binary variable which equals 1 if the sovereign has 
experienced sovereign defaults or debt restructuring, and zero otherwise. Domestic credit/GDP is the annual loans to the 
private sector as a proportion of GDP. Reserves/imports indicate the annual dollar amount of foreign exchange reserves 
relative to payments for imports. GDP growth is the 3-year average real growth in Gross Domestic Product. Inflation is 
the 3-year average rate of general price appreciation. CA balance/GDP is the 3-year average of current account balance 
as a proportion of GDP. Fiscal balance/GDP is the 3-year average of the fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP. 
Government debt/GDP is gross general government debt in US dollars as a percentage of GDP. Speculative grade 
dummy is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the average annual rating assigned by two CRAs for sovereign i 
at year t is at speculative-grade (BB+/Ba1 and lower). 
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Table 4. Results of Eq. (1) – Full sample of countries 
Explanatory Variables S&P vs. Moody's 
 
S&P vs. Fitch 
 
Moody's vs. Fitch 
FOIA (1-6) 
 
0.037 0.049 
  
0.079 0.086 
  
-0.010 0.002 
  
(0.56) (0.73) 
  
(1.10) (1.21) 
  
(-0.12) (0.02) 
WGI (rule of law) 
 
-0.487** 
   
-0.450* 
   
-0.584** 
 
  
(-2.21) 
   
(-1.94) 
   
(-2.33) 
 WGI (average) 
  
-0.626** 
   
-0.474* 
   
-0.593* 
   
(-2.30) 
   
(-1.67) 
   
(-1.70) 
Default Dummy (0/1) 0.227 0.152 0.175 
 
0.492 0.418 0.462 
 
-0.164 -0.319 -0.253 
 
(0.58) (0.38) (0.44) 
 
(1.14) (1.01) (1.10) 
 
(-0.33) (-0.67) (-0.53) 
Domestic Credit/GDP (%) 0.004** 0.005** 0.004** 
 
0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 
0.003 0.004 0.003 
 
(2.18) (2.46) (2.32) 
 
(3.73) (3.98) (3.88) 
 
(1.39) (1.64) (1.46) 
Reserves/Imports (%) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
-0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.09) (0.07) (0.08) 
 
(-0.28) (-0.34) (-0.33) 
 
(-0.67) (-0.74) (-0.72) 
GDP Growth (%) -0.004 -0.003 0.001 
 
0.011 0.010 0.013 
 
-0.016 -0.017 -0.014 
 
(-0.15) (-0.12) (0.06) 
 
(0.53) (0.49) (0.63) 
 
(-0.65) (-0.72) (-0.57) 
Inflation (%) 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
0.004 0.003 0.002 
 
(0.95) (0.72) (0.50) 
 
(0.27) (0.29) (0.12) 
 
(0.56) (0.45) (0.30) 
CA Balance/GDP (%) -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 
 
0.008 0.010 0.010 
 
-0.010 -0.012 -0.012 
 
(-0.97) (-0.95) (-1.04) 
 
(0.76) (0.90) (0.86) 
 
(-0.75) (-0.83) (-0.85) 
Fiscal Balance/GDP (%) 0.001 -0.001 0.006 
 
0.009 0.007 0.013 
 
-0.009 -0.012 -0.004 
 
(0.04) (-0.07) (0.31) 
 
(0.46) (0.35) (0.64) 
 
(-0.32) (-0.43) (-0.13) 
Government debt/GDP (%) 0.011*** 0.010** 0.011** 
 
0.006 0.005 0.005 
 
0.005 0.005 0.005 
 
(2.61) (2.55) (2.58) 
 
(1.34) (1.15) (1.19) 
 
(1.04) (1.00) (1.05) 
Speculative grade_dum 0.025 0.025 0.027 
 
0.239* 0.248* 0.239* 
 
0.252 0.229 0.225 
 
(0.18) (0.18) (0.19) 
 
(1.75) (1.85) (1.78) 
 
(1.24) (1.16) (1.14) 
Constant 0.332 0.245 0.335 
 
0.478 0.362 0.456 
 
1.191* 1.112* 1.218* 
 
(0.73) (0.54) (0.74) 
 
(0.88) (0.70) (0.85) 
 
(1.88) (1.80) (1.95) 
Year and Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 834 834 834 
 
686 686 686 
 
666 666 666 
R-squared (adjusted)  % 16.7 17.1 17.2 
 
19.6 20.2 20.0 
 
17.5 18.1 17.8 
The table presents the results of Eq. (1) using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. The data includes 61, 54, and 52 sovereigns with joint ratings respectively 
from S&P and Moody’s, S&P and Fitch, and Moody’s and Fitch between Jan 1997 and Sep 2011. The dependent variable is the annual standard deviation of daily 
rating differences (sd.split) using the 58-point rating scale. See Table 3 for the definitions of explanatory variables. We estimate Eq. (1) using one of the six 
worldwide governance indicators (WGI). The estimation results for ‘rule of law’ and Ave WGI (the average of these six WGI scores) are reported in this Table. 
Fixed effects are captured by a full set of country and year dummies. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 5. Results of Eq. (1) – Europe 
Explanatory Variables S&P vs. Moody's 
 
S&P vs. Fitch 
 
Moody's vs. Fitch 
FOIA (1-6) 
 
0.095 0.095 
  
0.101 0.096 
  
0.113 0.109 
  
(1.00) (0.98) 
  
(0.96) (0.89) 
  
(0.87) (0.83) 
WGI (rule of law) 
 
0.002 
   
0.352 
   
0.039 
 
  
(0.00) 
   
(1.23) 
   
(0.10) 
 WGI (average) 
  
-0.002 
   
0.346 
   
0.114 
   
(-0.00) 
   
(1.05) 
   
(0.22) 
Default Dummy (0/1) 2.339** 2.446** 2.445** 
 
0.689* 2.950*** 2.793*** 
 
1.581** 2.401* 2.556 
 
(2.23) (2.26) (2.13) 
 
(1.80) (3.02) (2.96) 
 
(2.22) (1.67) (1.64) 
Domestic Credit/GDP (%) 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 
0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
(1.40) (1.40) (1.43) 
 
(3.71) (3.57) (3.76) 
 
(1.20) (1.18) (1.22) 
Reserves/Imports (%) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
-0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(-0.68) (-0.62) (-0.63) 
 
(-0.70) (-0.76) (-0.70) 
 
(-0.61) (-0.61) (-0.61) 
GDP Growth (%) 0.012 0.011 0.011 
 
0.024 0.024 0.022 
 
-0.007 -0.008 -0.008 
 
(0.36) (0.33) (0.32) 
 
(0.92) (0.92) (0.84) 
 
(-0.20) (-0.23) (-0.24) 
Inflation (%) 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 
0.003 0.004 0.004 
 
0.008 0.008 0.008 
 
(0.98) (1.04) (1.02) 
 
(0.65) (0.78) (0.91) 
 
(1.02) (1.05) (1.05) 
CA Balance/GDP (%) -0.025 -0.023 -0.023 
 
-0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
 
-0.030 -0.028 -0.028 
 
(-1.35) (-1.21) (-1.21) 
 
(-0.40) (-0.34) (-0.31) 
 
(-1.40) (-1.29) (-1.30) 
Fiscal Balance/GDP (%) -0.043 -0.041 -0.041 
 
0.012 0.013 0.009 
 
-0.057 -0.058 -0.059 
 
(-1.26) (-1.24) (-1.22) 
 
(0.44) (0.47) (0.34) 
 
(-1.47) (-1.48) (-1.49) 
Government debt/GDP (%) 0.012 0.011 0.011 
 
0.015* 0.014 0.014 
 
0.009 0.007 0.007 
 
(1.33) (1.21) (1.21) 
 
(1.81) (1.59) (1.59) 
 
(0.86) (0.66) (0.67) 
Speculative grade_dum -0.347 -0.340 -0.340 
 
-0.136 -0.140 -0.124 
 
-0.422 -0.406 -0.398 
 
(-1.36) (-1.32) (-1.33) 
 
(-0.84) (-0.90) (-0.78) 
 
(-1.64) (-1.55) (-1.51) 
Constant -1.634* -0.902 -0.896 
 
0.148 -1.771** -1.723** 
 
0.160 -0.625 -0.746 
 
(-1.66) (-1.18) (-1.03) 
 
(0.29) (-2.45) (-2.32) 
 
(0.25) (-0.71) (-0.77) 
Year and Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
No of obs. 367 367 367 
 
320 320 320 
 
320 320 320 
R-squared (adjusted) % 22.8 22.5 22.5 
 
26.3 26.7 26.6 
 
26.4 26.1 26.1 
The table presents the results of Eq. (1) using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, using a sub-sample of countries in ‘Europe’ that have joint ratings 
respectively from S&P and Moody’s, S&P and Fitch, and Moody’s and Fitch between Jan 1997 and Sep 2011. The dependent variable is the annual standard 
deviation of daily rating differences (sd.split) using the 58-point rating scale. See Table 3 for the definitions of explanatory variables. We estimate Eq. (1) using one 
of the six worldwide governance indicators (WGI). The estimation results for ‘rule of law’ and Ave WGI (the average of these six WGI scores) are reported in this 
Table. Fixed effects are captured by a full set of country and year dummies. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels. 
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Table 6. Results of Eq. (1) – ROTW 
Explanatory Variables S&P vs. Moody's 
 
S&P vs. Fitch 
 
Moody's vs. Fitch 
FOIA (1-6) 
 
-0.062 -0.055 
  
-0.084 -0.081 
  
-0.217 -0.200 
  
(-0.63) (-0.57) 
  
(-0.74) (-0.72) 
  
(-1.62) (-1.51) 
WGI (rule of law) 
 
-0.699** 
   
-0.956*** 
   
-1.068*** 
 
  
(-2.51) 
   
(-2.95) 
   
(-3.35) 
 WGI (average) 
  
-0.789** 
   
-1.307*** 
   
-1.351*** 
   
(-2.18) 
   
(-2.81) 
   
(-2.81) 
Default Dummy (0/1) 0.105 -0.004 0.041 
 
0.496 0.284 0.328 
 
-0.100 -0.402 -0.343 
 
(0.26) (-0.01) (0.10) 
 
(1.21) (0.76) (0.85) 
 
(-0.20) (-0.83) (-0.72) 
Domestic Credit/GDP (%) 0.003 0.005 0.003 
 
0.004 0.004 0.003 
 
0.004 0.005 0.003 
 
(0.62) (0.88) (0.60) 
 
(0.79) (0.97) (0.58) 
 
(0.62) (0.81) (0.43) 
Reserves/Imports (%) -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 
0.001 0.000 0.001 
 
-0.004 -0.005 -0.004 
 
(-0.14) (-0.31) (-0.23) 
 
(0.33) (0.13) (0.29) 
 
(-1.54) (-1.60) (-1.49) 
GDP Growth (%) -0.023 -0.021 -0.017 
 
-0.017 -0.017 -0.013 
 
-0.041 -0.039 -0.034 
 
(-0.60) (-0.56) (-0.45) 
 
(-0.44) (-0.45) (-0.34) 
 
(-1.07) (-1.05) (-0.90) 
Inflation (%) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
-0.000 -0.001 -0.006 
 
-0.008 -0.011 -0.015 
 
(0.80) (0.85) (0.68) 
 
(-0.03) (-0.10) (-0.38) 
 
(-0.63) (-0.90) (-1.20) 
CA Balance/GDP (%) -0.003 -0.007 -0.011 
 
0.020 0.012 0.006 
 
0.004 -0.008 -0.014 
 
(-0.21) (-0.48) (-0.67) 
 
(0.84) (0.55) (0.26) 
 
(0.19) (-0.33) (-0.55) 
Fiscal Balance/GDP (%) 0.030 0.031 0.040 
 
0.049 0.046 0.069* 
 
0.062** 0.063** 0.084*** 
 
(1.25) (1.29) (1.64) 
 
(1.43) (1.41) (1.94) 
 
(2.02) (2.10) (2.65) 
Government debt/GDP (%) 0.007 0.007 0.008 
 
0.001 0.000 0.001 
 
0.003 0.003 0.004 
 
(1.37) (1.39) (1.48) 
 
(0.14) (0.03) (0.16) 
 
(0.49) (0.52) (0.68) 
speculative grade_dum 0.122 0.091 0.096 
 
0.382** 0.353** 0.344** 
 
0.559* 0.491* 0.489** 
 
(0.75) (0.58) (0.62) 
 
(1.99) (2.01) (2.02) 
 
(1.96) (1.96) (1.98) 
Constant 0.793 0.580 0.684 
 
0.683 0.528 0.694 
 
1.377* 1.266* 1.449** 
 
(1.47) (1.07) (1.27) 
 
(1.04) (0.88) (1.14) 
 
(1.86) (1.80) (2.07) 
Year and Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
No of obs. 467 467 467 
 
366 366 366 
 
346 346 346 
R-squared (adjusted) % 15.0 15.9 15.6 
 
17.7 20.0 20.2 
 
14.8 18.3 18.0 
The table presents the results of Eq. (1) using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, using a sub-sample of countries in the rest of the world (‘ROTW’) that have 
joint ratings respectively from S&P and Moody’s, S&P and Fitch, and Moody’s and Fitch between Jan 1997 and Sep 2011. The dependent variable is the annual 
standard deviation of daily rating differences (sd.split) using the 58-point rating scale. See Table 3 for the definitions of explanatory variables. We estimate Eq. (1) 
using one of the six worldwide governance indicators (WGI). The estimation results for ‘rule of law’ and Ave WGI (the average of these six WGI scores) are reported 
in this Table. Fixed effects are captured by a full set of country and year dummies. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels. 
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Table 7. Results of Eq. (1) – ROTW – Emerging countries 
Explanatory Variables S&P vs. Moody's 
 
S&P vs. Fitch 
 
Moody's vs. Fitch 
FOIA (1-6) 
 
-0.032 -0.038 
  
0.109 0.094 
  
-0.205** -0.202* 
  
(-0.29) (-0.35) 
  
(0.92) (0.81) 
  
(-1.99) (-1.81) 
WGI (rule of law) 
 
-0.659** 
   
-0.951*** 
   
-1.047*** 
 
  
(-2.17) 
   
(-3.16) 
   
(-3.57) 
 WGI (average) 
  
-0.382 
   
-0.800* 
   
-0.686* 
   
(-0.96) 
   
(-1.95) 
   
(-1.78) 
Default Dummy (0/1) 0.086 0.072 0.099 
 
0.337 0.309 0.351 
 
-0.343 -0.222 -0.167 
 
(0.17) (0.14) (0.19) 
 
(0.63) (0.56) (0.63) 
 
(-0.56) (-0.31) (-0.25) 
Domestic Credit/GDP (%) -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 
-0.000 0.002 0.001 
 
0.011 0.017** 0.014* 
 
(-0.19) (0.14) (-0.10) 
 
(-0.04) (0.31) (0.14) 
 
(1.52) (2.38) (1.89) 
Reserves/Imports (%) 0.001 -0.000 0.000 
 
0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
-0.009* -0.014** -0.013** 
 
(0.33) (-0.04) (0.08) 
 
(0.19) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(-1.82) (-2.59) (-2.41) 
GDP Growth (%) -0.060 -0.051 -0.054 
 
-0.064 -0.062 -0.060 
 
-0.025 -0.011 -0.015 
 
(-1.10) (-0.93) (-0.96) 
 
(-1.34) (-1.30) (-1.26) 
 
(-0.60) (-0.27) (-0.36) 
Inflation (%) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
-0.007 -0.006 -0.008 
 
-0.001 -0.003 -0.005 
 
(0.57) (0.66) (0.59) 
 
(-0.46) (-0.42) (-0.55) 
 
(-0.12) (-0.26) (-0.43) 
CA Balance/GDP (%) -0.016 -0.017 -0.017 
 
0.003 0.003 0.002 
 
0.034 0.037 0.035 
 
(-0.81) (-0.86) (-0.86) 
 
(0.10) (0.08) (0.07) 
 
(1.08) (1.21) (1.14) 
Fiscal Balance/GDP (%) 0.036 0.039 0.042 
 
0.113** 0.111** 0.119*** 
 
0.088* 0.095** 0.102** 
 
(1.23) (1.30) (1.38) 
 
(2.57) (2.58) (2.68) 
 
(1.91) (2.14) (2.18) 
Government debt/GDP (%) -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 
0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
-0.010 -0.008 -0.010 
 
(-0.15) (-0.04) (-0.10) 
 
(0.34) (0.34) (0.28) 
 
(-1.39) (-1.25) (-1.48) 
speculative grade_dum 0.026 -0.018 0.004 
 
0.259 0.251* 0.266* 
 
0.402* 0.309 0.339* 
 
(0.18) (-0.12) (0.03) 
 
(1.60) (1.68) (1.79) 
 
(1.86) (1.58) (1.67) 
Constant 1.178 0.825 0.585 
 
1.216 1.347 1.342 
 
1.323 1.503* 1.981** 
 
(1.07) (1.12) (0.78) 
 
(1.16) (1.33) (1.30) 
 
(1.57) (1.96) (2.48) 
Year and Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
No of obs. 317 317 317 
 
237 237 237 
 
209 209 209 
R-squared (adjusted) 12.5 12.9 12.1 
 
20.9 23.9 22.1 
 
19.5 24.6 20.8 
The table presents the results of Eq. (1) using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, using a sub-sample of emerging countries in the rest of the world (‘ROTW’) that have 
joint ratings respectively from S&P and Moody’s, S&P and Fitch, and Moody’s and Fitch between Jan 1997 and Sep 2011. The dependent variable is the annual standard 
deviation of daily rating differences (sd.split) using the 58-point rating scale. See Table 3 for the definitions of explanatory variables. We estimate Eq. (1) using one of the six 
worldwide governance indicators (WGI). The estimation results for ‘rule of law’ and Ave WGI (the average of these six WGI scores) are reported in this Table. Fixed effects 
are captured by a full set of country and year dummies. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 8. Economic significance of opacity (FOIA and WGI) in explaining split sovereign ratings 
 Panel A. Log likelihood 
ratio (LR) test 
 Panel B. Out-of-sample prediction 
  Mean absolute errors Mean squared errors 
 
Rule of law 
& FOIA 
Ave WGI 
& FOIA 
 Base model 
Rule of law 
& FOIA 
Ave WGI 
& FOIA 
Base model 
Rule of law 
& FOIA 
Ave WGI 
& FOIA 
S&P vs. Moody’s          
Full sample 6.25** 6.83**  0.628 0.641 0.636 0.790 0.791 0.791 
Europe 1.10 1.10  0.932 0.864 0.881 1.579 1.439 1.521 
ROTW 7.17** 5.60*  0.605 0.602 0.611 0.707 0.674 0.689 
ROTW-Emerging 3.83 0.86  0.798 0.793 0.799 1.130 1.046 1.098 
          
S&P vs. Fitch          
Full sample 7.16** 5.59**  0.647 0.679 0.679 0.845 0.876 0.880 
Europe 4.25 3.65  0.544 0.553 0.543 0.695 0.707 0.680 
ROTW 12.49*** 13.31***  0.706 0.698 0.686 1.053 0.996 0.978 
ROTW-Emerging 11.90*** 6.08**  0.719 0.782 0.769 1.061 1.228 1.226 
          
Moody’s vs. Fitch          
Full sample 7.08** 4.74*  0.667 0.661 0.676 0.896 0.884 0.901 
Europe 1.25 1.32  0.749 0.660 0.679 1.114 0.928 0.962 
ROTW 16.65*** 15.50***  0.742 0.637 0.661 1.116 0.925 0.954 
ROTW-Emerging 16.17*** 5.75*  0.615 0.608 0.611 0.709 0.668 0.700 
 
 
Panel A of the table presents the results of Likelihood Ratio (LR) test statistic with two restrictions on FOIA and WGI. The LR statistic is given by ‘-2 ln (L0/L1)’ where L1 
is the value of the likelihood function for the full model that includes all the variables with unconstrained coefficients (see Eq. 1) and L0 is the value of the likelihood function 
for the nested model in which coefficients on FOIA and WGI are restricted to zero. The LR statistic follows a Chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to two 
(the number of constraints imposed). ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
Panel B of the table presents the results of out-of-sample prediction analysis. We compare the predictive power of a full model incorporating two opacity variables (WGI and 
FOIA – Eq. 1) and a restricted base model without opacity variables (without WGI and FOIA, and only including the macroeconomic and financial indicators). We estimate 
the models using a data sample from 1997 to 2006, and use 2007 to 2011 as the hold-out period. The forecast of sd.split is produced for the hold-out period using coefficients 
estimated from the estimation period. Figures in bold indicate that the mean absolute and mean squared errors (deviations of actual values from their forecast values) are 
smaller in the full model than the base model. 
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Fig. 1. The distribution of daily rating differences for 64 sovereign issuers. We transform ratings using the 58-point comprehensive credit rating scale 
(CCR). Rating differences equal the ratings assigned by the first CRA minus the ratings assigned by the second CRA. The time periods are 1 January 1997 to 
30 September 2011 for S&P versus Moody's, and 1 January 1998 to 30 September 2011 for S&P versus Fitch and Moody's versus Fitch. 
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